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BY ROBERT M. HUNT
Whither Consumer Credit Counseling?
The availability and use of con-
sumer credit in the U.S. has grown 
dramatically over the last 50 years.1 
While this is undoubtedly beneficial, 
one consequence is that, at any time, 
there are a million or more consumers 
or more than 50 years, nonprofit credit 
counseling organizations have been helping 
consumers manage debt. Despite this long 
track record, credit counseling is not without 
controversy. In recent years, concerns about conflicts 
of interest and the emergence of a new type of credit 
counseling agency have triggered significant legislative 
and regulatory activity. In this article, Bob Hunt outlines 
the history and development of credit counseling in 
the United States, highlights the concerns raised about 
consumer protection, and describes industry, regulatory, 
and legislative responses.
having difficulties in managing their 
unsecured debts. For a half century, 
nonprofit credit counseling organiza-
tions have offered financial education 
and budget counseling sessions for free 
or at nominal cost to borrowers. They 
also negotiate comprehensive repay-
ment plans (debt management plans) 
with a borrower’s unsecured creditors. 
These repayment plans provide an 
alternative to bankruptcy that is valu-
able to many consumers. 
But credit counseling is not with-
out controversy. The older counseling 
organizations rely primarily on credi-
tors for their revenues, and this may 
create the appearance of a conflict 
of interest. More recently, many new 
debt counseling organizations have 
appeared on the scene. This new breed 
relies less on creditors for revenues 
because they charge borrowers signifi-
cantly more for their services. If these 
higher fees are drawn from a borrower’s 
limited reserves, he or she may have 
additional difficulty completing the 
repayment plan. In addition, creditors 
worry that at least some of these new 
organizations are not screening their 
clients—proposing concessions for 
borrowers who could have paid their 
debts on the original terms. This has 
affected how creditors work with coun-
selors. These concerns and others have 
triggered significant legislative and 
regulatory activity in recent years.
The credit counseling industry 
is an important one, but its activities 
and effects are not widely understood. 
Still the available research does 
give us some insight into the effects 
of consumer credit counseling and 
debt management plans on borrower 
behavior and the implications for the 
industry and regulation.  
Any conclusions, unfortunately, 
must be tentative. There are few 
formal studies of the contribution of 
credit counseling organizations, and 
they must wrestle with a difficult 
methodological problem: Do borrowers 
who seek credit counseling perform 
better because of the counseling (a 
treatment effect) or because they are 
somehow different from borrowers 
who don’t seek counseling (a selection 
effect)?
BACKGROUND
Credit counseling organizations 
typically provide four types of services 
to consumers:  (1) they offer consumer 
financial education; (2) they offer 
budget counseling to individual house-
holds; (3) they negotiate debt manage-
ment plans with creditors on behalf of 
borrowers; and (4) when appropriate, 
1  This article was inspired by two workshops 
organized by the Philadelphia Fed’s Payment 
Cards Center in 2001 and 2003. These work-
shops are summarized in the article by Anne 
Stanley and the one by Mark Furletti. I thank 
Patti Hasson for many helpful discussions. Chris 
Ody and Paul Weiss helped me compile the data 
for this article.
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they refer consumers to other support 
organizations or recommend that they 
seek advice about a bankruptcy filing. 
A debt management plan is a 
schedule for repaying all of the bor-
rower’s unsecured debts over three to 
five years.2 Ideally, the credit counselor 
is able to include all of the borrower’s 
unsecured creditors in the plan. While 
the principal is repaid in full, credi-
tors typically reduce interest rates and 
other charges. Creditors are sometimes 
willing to re-age accounts in a debt 
management plan. In other words, 
assuming plan payments are made, 
the creditor considers the account as 
current and reports it this way to credit 
bureaus. This improves the borrower’s 
payment history and credit rating.
An essential feature of the benefit 
credit counselors offer is the ability to 
coordinate the concessions made by 
a borrower’s creditors. Of course, bor-
rowers can negotiate with individual 
creditors, but they must overcome each 
creditor’s concern that any conces-
sion it makes benefits the borrower’s 
other creditors at its expense. Winton 
Williams coined a phrase for this phe-
nomenon—the creditor’s dilemma.3 All 
creditors would likely benefit if they all 
agreed to refrain from legal action and 
allow the borrower more time to repay. 
But if all creditors agree to this ap-
proach, any individual creditor might 
do better by insisting on being repaid 
from the proceeds of the concessions 
offered by other creditors. If creditors 
distrust each other, they will refuse to 
make concessions and possibly race to 
secure claims on the borrower’s cash 
flow (by garnishing wages) or assets 
(by placing liens on the borrower’s 
2 An unsecured debt is one in which the bor-
rower does not pledge collateral (e.g., a house 
or car) that may be taken by the creditor in the 
event the borrower defaults on the loan. Credit 
card debts are almost always unsecured.
3 See Williams’s book, Games Creditors Play.
property). If this happens, the borrow-
er is more likely to file for bankruptcy, 
and all the unsecured creditors are 
likely to recover very little.
Credit counselors can often avoid 
this outcome. Through repeated inter-
actions with creditors, they have es-
tablished a reputation for securing the 
agreement of most or all of a borrower’s 
creditors and establishing repayment 
plans that put each creditor on more 
or less the same footing in terms of 
the borrower’s resources. This reduces 
the risk of a run against the borrower, 
which, in turn, increases the chances 
the creditors will be repaid. 
Note that participation in debt 
management plans is entirely volun-
tary. Borrowers need not seek a credit 
counselor, and they may abandon 
a repayment plan if they so choose. 
Similarly, creditors cannot be forced to 
agree to a debt management plan, and 
they are free to resort to collections 
activity or other legal activity at any 
time. Clearly, what makes these plans 
work, when they do work, is a good 
deal of trust that is fostered by the 
credit counselor.  
Origins of the Nonprofit Credit 
Counseling Industry. The traditional 
nonprofit credit counseling organiza-
tions emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, 
partially in response to the rapid 
growth in unsecured consumer debt 
during that time. Many were organized 
by or with the support of creditors. 
During this same period, many states 
enacted legislation to regulate or sim-
ply ban the operation of the existing 
for-profit debt counselors (sometimes 
called debt poolers or proraters) on 
consumer protection grounds. Most 
states deliberately exempted nonprofit 
counseling organizations from these 
laws in the hope that they would con-
tinue to develop.4
A national trade organization, 
what is now called the National Foun-
dation for Credit Counseling (NFCC), 
became active in 1951. At its peak, 
NFCC membership included about 200 
organizations with about 1,500 offices 
around the country.5 Today, NFCC 
member organizations counsel 1.5 mil-
lion borrowers each year. They admin-
ister nearly 600,000 debt management 
plans, which pay unsecured creditors 
at least $2.5 billion a year. To put these 
numbers into perspective, very roughly 
speaking, each year NFCC member 
agencies counsel about 1 percent of 
American bankcard holders, and there 
is one debt management plan for every 
two personal bankruptcy filings.
These nonprofit credit counselors 
rely primarily on contributions from 
creditors for their revenues. Under 
a norm called fair share, creditors 
would return to the credit counselor 
about 12 percent of debt payments it 
helped to facilitate. These contribu-
tions accounted for two-thirds or more 
An essential feature of the beneﬁt credit 
counselors offer is the ability to coordinate the 
concessions made by a borrower’s creditors.
4 See the book by Perry Hall; section V of the 
Northwestern University Law Review Con-
sumer Credit Symposium; the article by Abbey 
Sniderman-Milstein and Bruce Ratner; and the 
article by Margery Kabot Schiller. For a recent 
review of state regulations, see the report by the 
California Department of Corporations and the 
report by Deanne Loonin and Heather Packard.
5 Not all credit counseling organizations are 
NFCC members. Others are members of the 
Association of Independent Consumer Credit 
Counseling Agencies (AICCCA).Business Review  Q4  2005   11 www.philadelphiafed.org
6 Until recently, this source of funding was not 
always disclosed to borrowers. In 1997, the 
NFCC reached an agreement with the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to make such disclo-
sures a matter of policy.
7 This question applies equally to credit coun-
selors that rely primarily on fees charged to 
consumers.
8 Another third of borrowers receive financial 
education or household budget counseling. 
of the revenues of traditional credit 
counselors, but the share has fallen in 
recent years.6 In the past, fair share 
receipts exceeded the cost of adminis-
tering debt management plans, which 
afforded resources for the agencies’ 
consumer education and budget coun-
seling programs.
Some argue that a dependence 
on creditors for revenues creates at 
least a potential conflict of interest. 
For example, does a credit counselor 
that relies on fair share payments have 
an adequate incentive to suggest that 
a consumer seek legal advice about 
bankruptcy?7 About 6 percent of bor-
rowers who contact an NFCC member 
agency are referred to legal assistance, 
while 30 to 35 percent are enrolled 
in a debt management plan.8 While 
these numbers suggest that counseling 
agencies might steer some borrowers 
away from bankruptcy, we need to 
know a good deal more about borrow-
ers’ circumstances and preferences to 
conclude that this pattern is inappro-
priate from the standpoint of borrow-
ers or society.
OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO 
DISTRESSED BORROWERS
Why do borrowers enter into debt 
management plans? Why are unse-
cured creditors willing to accept these 
plans? The answer is that participating 
in the plans is better than the alter-
natives for some borrowers and their 
creditors (see Pros and Cons of Options 
Available to Borrowers). Depending on 
the resources available, borrowers can 
choose between repaying on the origi-
nal terms, not paying but not filing for 
bankruptcy either (informal bankrupt-
cy), and formal bankruptcy. Creditors 
can be either more or less aggressive 
in their collection efforts, or they may 
take legal action, such as obtaining an 
order to garnish wages.
One factor that influences bor-
rowers’ choice is the effect on their 
future access to credit. Obviously, 
timely repayment on the original terms 
preserves the borrower’s credit history 
and is most likely to ensure future 
access to credit on good terms. Under 
the informal or formal bankruptcy 
options, borrowers will have difficulty 
obtaining new credit on affordable 
terms for a long time. A bankruptcy 
flag remains on a borrower’s credit 
report for 10 years.
Another factor that influences 
borrowers’ choice is the size of the 
payments they make and how creditors 
respond. Payments are typically larg-
est if the debt is paid on the original 
terms. Alternatively, the consumer 
can simply stop making payments 
(informal bankruptcy). But this option 
affords borrowers few protections from 
debt collectors. They can’t prevent 
repossession of their car or foreclosure 
on their house. They can’t prevent 
creditors from placing liens against the 
real property they own. They have few 
ways of avoiding garnishment of their 
wages. Still, many distressed borrowers 
choose not to repay and not to file for 
bankruptcy.9 
Two Forms of Bankruptcy for 
Consumers. Most borrowers can 
choose between two forms of bank-
ruptcy: Chapter 7 (liquidation) or 
Chapter 13 (a wage-earner plan).10 
Both chapters impose a stay on collec-
tions and legal actions by creditors. In 
the case of Chapter 13, this may allow 
the borrower to catch up on mortgage 
payments and avoid foreclosure.
Under Chapter 7, the borrower’s 
assets (except for certain exempt 
property) are used to pay some portion 
of the debts owed to unsecured credi-
tors.11 The remaining unsecured debt 
is discharged, so the consumer’s future 
income is unencumbered. In practice, 
borrowers filing under this chapter 
rarely have assets to surrender, so un-
secured creditors receive little or noth-
ing. The claims of secured creditors 
are unaffected, so they can eventually 
foreclose on those assets if they choose. 
It is not uncommon for borrowers to 
reaffirm their secured debts in order to 
retain the collateral (such as the car or 
the house).
Alternatively, the borrower can 
file under Chapter 13 of the bank-
ruptcy code. Under this chapter, the 
borrower can keep his or her assets 
but must propose a repayment plan 
financed by a significant share of his 
or her future income over the next 
several years. The plan must offer 
9 See the paper by Lawrence Ausubel and 
Amanda Dawsey and the article by Michele 
White.
10 Good summaries of consumer bankruptcy 
law are found in the article by Wenli Li and the 
one by Loretta Mester. Significant changes to 
U.S. bankruptcy law were enacted in 2005 (see 
page 17).
11 Exempt property is typically determined by 
state law. It may include some portion of equity 
in the borrower’s home, automobiles, household 
goods and clothing, and tools used for one’s 
trade.
Most borrowers can 
choose between two 
forms of bankruptcy: 
Chapter 7 (liquidation) 
or Chapter 13 (a 
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ers have important assets, financed 
by secured loans, which they are also 
having trouble paying, a bankruptcy 
filing may be the better option. In 
this situation, a borrower who enters a 
debt management plan might increase 
the risk of losing the house because 
he or she has pledged income to pay 
unsecured debts that would probably 
be discharged in bankruptcy. In short, 
while debt management plans are 
useful for many distressed borrowers, 
they are not suitable for all borrowers 
in trouble, and they are not simply a 
substitute for a Chapter 13 filing.   
Why Do Creditors Agree to Par-
ticipate in Debt Management Plans? 
From the creditor’s standpoint, the net 
benefit of agreeing to a debt manage-
ment plan depends on what they think 
the borrower will do in the absence 
of the plan. If the creditor thinks a 
borrower will otherwise stop paying 
altogether or enter bankruptcy, the 
creditor might recover more if it agrees 
to a debt management plan than if it 
refuses. But if the creditor thinks a 
borrower would otherwise continue to 
pay, agreeing to a debt management 
plan would likely reduce the payments 
the creditor will receive. After all, 
longer repayment terms, lower inter-
est charges and fees, plus fair share 
payments come at the expense of the 
creditor. 
Do borrowers who 
seek out credit 
counseling perform 
better because of 
the counseling or 
because they are 
somehow different 
from borrowers 
who don’t seek 
counseling?
unsecured creditors at least as much 
as they would obtain under a Chapter 
7 filing, but, as noted above, this is 
typically not very much. Creditors 
cannot reject the terms of a plan if 
the borrower has pledged his or her 
entire disposable income over the next 
three to five years for debt payments. 
Disposable income here means income 
after taxes, basic living expenses, and 
tuition. Upon completion of the plan, 
the remaining unsecured debts are 
discharged. In practice, unsecured 
creditors typically receive a fraction of 
the outstanding principal (see below). 
General unsecured creditors received 
about $815 million from Chapter 13 
plans during the 2001 fiscal year.12 
Debt Management Plans Are 
Not the Same as Chapter 13. While 
debt management plans are similar in 
many ways to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
filing, there are several important dif-
ferences.13 Borrowers who participate 
in a debt management plan should be 
able to improve their credit history 
more quickly than if they default or
file for bankruptcy. This should mean 
they are able to gain access to new 
credit more rapidly.14 Unlike most 
Chapter 13 plans, debt management 
plans expect the borrower to repay the 
entire principal owed. A number of 
protections afforded in bankruptcy are 
absent in a debt management plan.
For example, participation in a debt 
management plan does not protect 
the borrower from legal action by his 
or her creditors. Nor are creditors 
compelled to accept a proposed debt 
management plan. 
Debt management plans also do 
not address secured credit. If consum-
12 See the  article by Ed Flynn, Gordon Burke, 
and Karen Bakewell.  
13 See the 1999 and 2004 articles by David 
Lander.
14 There is no direct test for this, but the Visa 
study (discussed later) is suggestive. 
What’s more, creditors’ expecta-
tions depend significantly on what 
they expect a borrower’s other credi-
tors will do. As explained earlier, if 
it is likely that another creditor will 
push a borrower into bankruptcy, every 
creditor has less incentive to offer 
concessions or to refrain from collec-
tions activity.
WHAT DO CREDIT 
COUNSELORS ACCOMPLISH? 
Once again, it’s important to 
recognize the very difficult problem 
of selection: Do borrowers who seek 
out credit counseling perform better 
because of the counseling or because 
they are somehow different from bor-
rowers who don’t seek counseling? It is 
at least possible that any measured dif-
ferences between these groups is due to 
a selection effect (perhaps only highly 
motivated borrowers seek out counsel-
ing) rather than a treatment effect (the 
counseling itself helps borrowers to 
manage their debts).  
Debt Management Plans. Ac-
cording to data from NFCC members, 
a typical debt management plan 
included $16,000 in unsecured debts, 
roughly 40 percent of the annual 
income of the participating borrow-
ers.15 Despite this remarkable degree 
of leverage, about one-quarter of plan 
participants remain in the plans until 
all their debts are paid off. In many 
other cases, borrowers pay down some 
of their debts and exit the plans to 
manage the remainder on their own. 
Still, approximately one-half of debt 
management plans fail after about six 
months. In some instances, borrow-
ers have pledged more cash flow than 
they can afford. In others, one or more 
creditors refuse to accept the terms 
15 These borrowers had an average total indebt-
edness of $51,000 including mortgages, medical 
debt, and tax liens.14   Q4  2005 Business Review  www.philadelphiafed.org
of a plan and take actions (such as 
garnishment) that push the borrower 
into bankruptcy. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the 
completion rate of debt management 
plans is a bit higher than for Chap-
ter 13 plans (which is only about 33 
percent). But the criterion for success 
is different under debt management 
plans, where the entire principal is 
expected to be repaid. Even in suc-
cessful Chapter 13 plans, unsecured 
creditors receive only about 35 percent 
of the original principal.16 Chapter 13 
plans are also costly to administer. The 
average attorney’s and trustee’s fees for 
a Chapter 13 case in 2003 were $1,500, 
or about 14 percent of the amount 
repaid.17
A 1999 study conducted by Visa 
provides some insights into the success 
or failure of debt management plans. 
Borrowers who dropped out were more 
likely to be unemployed or to lose their 
jobs. Similarly, borrowers with lower 
income were less likely to complete 
their plans. Almost a third of borrow-
ers who dropped out of a debt manage-
ment plan had filed for bankruptcy. 
Compared to a separate survey of 
borrowers who filed for bankruptcy, 
participants in debt management 
plans appear to enjoy better access to 
unsecured and secured credit. Those 
successfully completing a debt manage-
ment plan were more likely to hold a 
credit card than those who could not. 
Borrowers who successfully completed 
a debt management plan were more 
likely to buy a house than those who 
did not complete the plan.  
Visa asked borrowers why they 
sought credit counseling. Respondents 
were three times as likely to mention 
a desire to get out of debt, or concerns 
about being overextended, than to cite 
creditors’ collection tactics or the de-
sire to avoid a bankruptcy filing.18 This 
may suggest that borrowers who enter 
into debt management plans are differ-
ent from other distressed borrowers. To 
rule out such a possibility, researchers 
typically devise studies that randomly 
assign participants into treatment and 
control groups and then examine dif-
ferences in outcomes between these 
groups.19 
Is there any evidence that credi-
tors do better with accounts in debt 
management plans than with accounts 
held by borrowers with similar observ-
able characteristics? Creditors obvious-
ly believe they do, or they would not 
be willing to participate in the plans. 
Ralph Spurgeon describes the results 
of comparison between two sets of 
cardholders at a large store chain: One 
group enrolled in debt management 
plans, and the other group did not.20 
The chain lost money on both groups 
of accounts, but it lost 32 percent less 
on the accounts in debt management 
plans. Taking into account fair share 
payments to the credit counseling or-
ganizations, the chain’s net losses were 
17 percent lower. 
Consumer Financial Education. 
There is some evidence of significant 
effects for the counseling programs 
offered by NFCC member organiza-
tions. In one study, only 7 percent of 
consumers counseled filed for bank-
ruptcy, compared with 25 percent in a 
comparable control group. In another 
study, economists Gregory Elliehausen, 
Christopher Lundquist, and Michael 
Staten examined the effect of budget 
counseling (not debt management 
plans) on borrower credit quality, as 
measured by data contained in credit 
bureau files for about 6,000 borrowers 
just before and three years after the 
counseling session (that is, in 1997 
and in 2000). Improvements among 
this group were compared to changes 
in the creditworthiness of a compa-
rable control group—comparable in 
the sense that individuals with similar 
credit scores were drawn from the 
same geographic areas as those who 
were counseled.21 
The authors report significant 
improvements in a wide variety of 
measures of creditworthiness among 
borrowers who sought credit counsel-
ing. Relative to the control group, 
counseled borrowers increased their 
credit scores and decreased their 
total indebtedness and the number 
of accounts with balances. They also 
experienced a significant decline in 
the number of delinquent accounts. 
16 The statistics on debt management plans 
are from the articles by David Lander and 
statistics provided by the NFCC. The statistics 
on Chapter 13 plans are from the report by the 
Congressional Budget Office and the articles 
by Jean Braucher; Scott Norberg; and William 
Whitford. 
17 See the 2005 article by Gordon Bermant. 
These amounts do not include filing fees.
18 But when asked, “What was the last straw?” 
borrowers cited collection tactics four times as 
often as any other factor.
19 There is now at least one study of this sort 
for debt management plans underway. See the 
article by Ladwig.
20 The samples were selected to exhibit compa-
rable distributions of credit scores. 
Is there any evidence that creditors do better 
with accounts in debt management plans than 
with accounts held by borrowers with similar 
observable characteristics? 
21 Borrowers who received counseling were 
identified from the files of five NFCC member 
counseling organizations.Business Review  Q4  2005   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
The effects were the largest among 
borrowers with the lowest credit scores 
around the time they sought out credit 
counseling.
There remains the concern that 
the borrowers who sought out credit 
counseling are somehow different from 
other borrowers. In their analysis, 
Elliehausen, Lundquist, and Staten try 
to control for this by first attempting to 
predict, using data contained in credit 
bureau files, which borrowers would 
seek out counseling. That makes this 
study superior to most other studies, 
but we still cannot be entirely sure the 
authors’ technique has fully controlled 
for selection bias.
A REVOLUTION IN THE 
CREDIT COUNSELING 
INDUSTRY?
Around 1990, there were about 
200 nonprofit credit counseling 
organizations in the U.S. It took 30 
years to reach that number. But this 
process of gradual increase changed 
dramatically in the 1990s. After 1994, 
at least 1,200 new organizations began 
counseling borrowers; three-quarters of 
these became active after 1999.22 This 
new breed has been very successful, 
taking market share away from NFCC 
member organizations. Several of the 
new organizations are the largest in 
the field, managing roughly $7 billion 
in outstanding debts.23 
The new breed is different from 
the previous generation of counseling 
agencies. For example, they are more 
automated, and they invest much more 
heavily in advertising. They also focus 
almost exclusively on debt manage-
ment plans. They offer little budget 
counseling or financial education. 
They rely more on borrowers, and 
less on creditors, for their revenues. 
They do this by charging borrow-
ers significantly higher fees than the 
traditional counseling agencies. It can 
cost a borrower $1,000 or more in 
fees to complete a debt management 
plan with some of the new counseling 
organizations.24
Some members of the new breed 
have been accused of engaging in egre-
gious trade practices, similar to those 
attributed to the for-profit debt coun-
seling organizations of the 1950s and 
1960s.25 Some organizations apply the 
first month of debt payments to plan 
fees rather than payments to creditors, 
but they don’t disclose this information 
to borrowers. As a result, these bor-
rowers fall further behind with their 
creditors. Other counseling organiza-
tions charge borrowers large upfront 
fees. Some deduct significant fees ($50 
or more) from borrowers’ monthly 
debt payments. Some counselors don’t 
include all unsecured creditors in the 
plan, increasing the risk of legal action 
against the borrower and ensuring the 
failure of the plan. The completion 
rate on plans administered by some of 
the largest of the new counseling orga-
nizations is rather low—only 2 percent 
in one instance.26
Why the Influx of New Coun-
seling Organizations? Several factors 
explain the influx of new organizations 
into the counseling industry. For one, 
demand for these services has in-
creased significantly. Consider the case 
of general purpose credit cards issued 
by banks. In the 11 years between 1992 
and 2003, the number of bankcard 
holders increased by nearly 33 million. 
Among this group, the share that was 
seriously delinquent rose gradually 
until 1999 and then rose rapidly as 
the U.S. entered into recession. The 
combination of these two trends has 
contributed to a tripling of the number 
of delinquent cardholders (Figure 1).27 
This also corresponds with a period 
of rapid increase in bankruptcy filings 
and in active debt management plans 
relative to the population (Figure 2). 
The recent decline in the use of debt 
management plans may be due in part 
to rising house prices (and low interest 
rates), which have helped many con-
sumers to pay down their unsecured 
debts using home equity loans.28
A second factor is that barriers to 
entry into the credit counseling busi-
ness have fallen, at least temporarily. 
There are a number of reasons for this. 
For one, nonprofit credit counseling 
organizations are lightly regulated at 
the state and local level, and there is 
no federal regulation that directly ad-
dresses this industry.29 Another is that 
22 Not all of these survive—there are currently 
about 870 active nonprofit credit counseling 
organizations.
23 This number is calculated from the 2005 
report by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations (hereafter Senate Report).
 
24 By way of contrast, the average set-up fee 
among NFCC organizations is $25, and the 
average monthly maintenance fee is $15.
25 While it is difficult to measure the frequency 
of such practices, a number of examples can be 
found in the Senate Report, the testimony of 
Howard Beales of the FTC, and the report by 
Deanne Loonin and Travis Plunkett.
 
26 See the March 30, 2005, FTC press release. 
27 A similar pattern is observed when compar-
ing the 1992 and 2001 editions of the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). According to the 
SCF, the number of families with bankcards 
increased by 19 million. The share of families 60 
or more days late on a debt payment increased 
from 6 to 7 percent. Taking into account the 
increase in households over this period, it ap-
pears that about 1.9 million more families were 
having trouble paying their debts in 2001 than 
in 1992.
28 Another factor was the declining market 
share of NFCC members—the figure includes 
only debt management plans administered by 
those organizations.
29 The Federal Trade Commission can sue 
counseling organizations that engage in unfair 
or deceptive trade practices, but its jurisdic-
tion does not include nonprofit organizations. 
That means the FTC must also convince a 
court that these institutions are “organized to 
carry on business for its own profit or that of its 
members.”16   Q4  2005 Business Review  www.philadelphiafed.org
advances in technology (call centers, 
the Internet, data processing, and elec-
tronic payments) reduced the upfront 
cost of setting up debt management 
plans and the ongoing cost of admin-
istering them. But these technologies 
also require significant investment, 
and that is one reason newer counsel-
ing organizations seek the business of 
borrowers around the country rather 
than in a particular local market, as 
was common with the older counseling 
organizations. 
Another reason barriers to entry 
were at least initially low is the amount 
of trust established between credit 
counselors and creditors over the 
previous 30 years. Creditors expected 
counselors to properly screen borrowers 
and were willing to provide generous 
fair share payments. At least initially, 
creditors treated the new organizations 
much as they did the older ones.30 The 
success of the existing institutions also 
invited entry. If fair share payments 
could be used to subsidize education 
and budget counseling, profits could 
be earned by organizations willing to 
focus on just debt management plans, 
assuming they are successful in attract-
ing borrowers.
The Relationship with Credi-
tors. Credit counselors no longer enjoy 
the same relationship with creditors. 
One reason is that the out-of-pocket 
costs for debt management plans have 
become quite large. The share of large 
credit card portfolios that consist of 
accounts in debt management plans 
is now about 2 to 3 percent. About a 
quarter of the collections budget of 
FIGURE 1
Delinquent Bank Cardholders (thousands)
FIGURE 2
Bankruptcy & Debt Management Plans per 
Thousand of Population 16 and Older
30 This may be due in part to antitrust concerns. 
In 1994, several independent credit counseling 
organizations sued Discover Card and NFCC, 
alleging an illegal restraint of trade, because 
Discover would make fair share payments only 
to NFCC members. The suit was eventually 
settled. 
Sources:  Author’s calculations based on data from the Statistical Abstract of the United   
Sources:  States, The Nilson Report, and TransUnion’s Trendata.
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major credit card lenders is spent on 
fair share payments.31 
While it has always been difficult 
to quantify the benefit to creditors 
of participating in debt management 
plans, creditors suspect the benefits 
to them may have fallen. With the 
entry of the new breed, creditors are 
convinced that at least some consum-
ers that would otherwise pay their 
unsecured debts are simply seeking 
more advantageous terms. 
At the same time, creditors began 
to reduce their fair share payments 
from the 12 to 15 percent typical of 20 
years ago to half this amount, or even 
lower, today. Among NFCC members, 
fair share payments currently average 
about 6 percent of payments made to 
creditors. Revenue compression has 
contributed to consolidation among 
NFCC members and the near failure 
of others.32 In contrast, the new breed 
is less affected because they rely more 
on fees paid by the borrowers and are 
more willing to raise those fees.  
In addition, creditors have re-
duced the concessions (such as lower 
interest rates) they offer to borrowers 
enrolled in debt management plans, 
making them more difficult to com-
plete.33 This has a significant effect on 
borrowers, since balances take longer 
to pay off when the interest rates are 
higher. As a result, borrowers pay 
down less debt over the typical three- 
to five-year length of a debt manage-
ment plan. In addition, borrowers are 
more likely to become discouraged and 
drop out of the plan altogether.  
COUNSELORS, CREDITORS, 
AND REGULATORS RESPOND 
More recently, there are signs 
that established credit counselors and 
creditors are responding to the influx 
of counseling organizations. For ex-
ample, the NFCC has established new 
standards for its member organizations, 
including accreditation of counselors, 
licensing and bonding requirements, 
annual audits of accounts, educational 
and counseling requirements, and 
disclosure of financing sources and 
fees. In addition, the NFCC prohib-
its the payment of bonuses to credit 
counselors, charging consumers fees 
in advance of providing services, and 
“prescreening” consumers to be solic-
ited for debt management plans.
Credit counselors are seeking 
alternative funding sources for their fi-
nancial education and budget counsel-
ing efforts. They are also participating 
in studies to demonstrate the efficacy 
of these programs. NFCC members are 
also making significant investments in 
IT to improve their productivity.
Creditor Action. Lenders are 
changing their relationship with 
counseling organizations. For example, 
they now play a more active role in 
determining which consumers should 
be eligible for debt management 
plans. Some creditors make fair share 
payments only to counseling organiza-
tions that meet specific standards, for 
example, by limiting fees charged to 
borrowers.
Creditors are adopting back-
loaded fair share payments and other 
pay-for-performance formulas. For 
example, when a borrower starts a debt 
management plan, the creditor may 
return only 2 percent to the coun-
seling organization. If the borrower 
remains current on the plan for a year, 
the creditor may return an additional 
7 percent of plan payments to the 
counseling organization. Other lenders 
are replacing fair share contributions 
altogether with charitable contribu-
tions made to nonprofit counseling 
organizations that apply for support.34 
In short, large creditors are concen-
trating their fair share payments on a 
smaller number of counseling organi-
zations—ones that can demonstrate 
their effectiveness. These changes are 
relatively new, so creditors and credit 
counselors continue to hone the mea-
sures of effectiveness used to determine 
fair share payments.
Legislation. The most significant 
changes affecting the credit counsel-
ing industry are those contained in 
the recently enacted bankruptcy law.35 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
limits access to Chapter 7 for some 
high-income borrowers, leaving them 
to consider either a workout under 
Chapter 13 or a debt management plan 
negotiated by a credit counseling orga-
nization. The act also lengthens from 
six to eight the number of years before 
a borrower can obtain another Chapter 
7 discharge. 
In addition, borrowers are now re-
quired to obtain credit counseling from 
an approved nonprofit organization be-
fore filing for bankruptcy. To obtain a 
31 See the article by Linda Punch and the Senate 
Report.
32 See the report by Deanne Loonin and Travis 
Plunkett and the article by Jane Adler.
33 See the 1999 press release by the Consumer 
Federation of America. It also documents the 
decline in fair share contribution ratios among a 
number of large banks.
Large creditors are 
concentrating their 
fair share payments 
on a smaller number 
of counseling 
organizations—ones 
that can demonstrate 
their effectiveness.
34 For examples, see the Senate Report and 
the articles by David Breitkopf and Burney 
Simpson.
35 Public Law No. 109-8. For a summary, see 
the January-March 2005 issue of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Banking Legisla-
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36 See the September 2005 press release from the 
NFCC.
37 A list of approved counseling organizations 
can be found at www.usdoj.gov/ust/bapcpa/
ccde/index.htm. There is also a list of orga-
nizations approved to provide instruction in 
personal financial management.
discharge of their debts in bankruptcy, 
borrowers must first complete a course 
in personal financial management. 
The NFCC estimated its members 
would provide 780,000 pre-filing coun-
seling sessions and 535,000 pre-dis-
charge education sessions in the first 
year after the law took effect (October 
17, 2005). This will require an increase 
of more than 1,000 counselors.36
The law specifies minimum 
standards to be used by U.S. trustees 
or the courts to determine whether a 
nonprofit credit counseling organiza-
tion is approved for the purposes of 
the mandatory counseling require-
ment. Assuming these standards are 
sufficiently rigorous, such a certifica-
tion process could make it easier for 
consumers to identify reputable credit 
counselors. The law also requires the 
Executive Office for U.S. trustees to 
develop standards for the required con-
sumer financial education programs 
and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
those efforts.37
This law includes a provision 
designed to encourage unsecured 
creditors to accept debt management 
plans proposed by credit counselors. If 
such a plan would repay 60 percent of 
the original principal (under current 
practice these plans return 100 percent 
of the principal), and the creditor 
refuses to participate, a borrower filing 
for bankruptcy can petition the court 
to reduce the outstanding debt by up 
to 20 percent. The likely effect of this 
provision is unclear. If a borrower is 
able to file under Chapter 7, most or 
all of his or her unsecured debts will 
be discharged anyway. Most Chapter 
13 repayment plans offer unsecured 
creditors some portion of the original 
principal, but it is typically small and 
even less is usually repaid. A 20 per-
cent reduction in such amounts may be 
insufficient to influence the decisions 
of unsecured creditors.
 There are a number of other leg-
islative proposals at the federal level. A 
2003 bill, the Debt Counseling, Debt 
Consolidation, and Debt Settlement 
Practices Act (H.R. 3331), would 
make explicit that credit counseling 
organizations, irrespective of their 
nonprofit status, can be sued for unfair 
and deceptive trade practices. There 
are also proposals to revise the 1996 
Credit Repair Organizations Act with 
credit counselors in mind. That law 
currently does not apply to nonprofit 
organizations. A recent federal court 
case, however, makes clear that the 
act will apply to tax-exempt charities 
that are, in fact, operated as for-profit 
organizations.38
The National Consumer Law 
Center, together with the Consumer 
Federation of America, has proposed 
a model state law to regulate credit 
counselors. The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws is also working on a draft 
Uniform Consumer Debt Counseling 
Act that would, among other things, 
regulate fees charged to consumers for 
debt management plans and require 
that counselors spend at least as much 
on education as they do on advertising. 
Regulatory Action. Since 
2003, the Internal Revenue Service 
has initiated investigations into the 
nonprofit status of 59 credit counsel-
ing organizations, which collectively 
account for approximately 50 percent 
of the industry’s revenues. It has since 
revoked the tax-exempt status of six 
organizations and denied applications 
for nonprofit status to 20 others.39 Also 
in 2003, the FTC sued a number of 
the newer counseling organizations 
for engaging in unfair and deceptive 
trade practices and operating as for-
profit enterprises. In 2005, the FTC 
concluded a number of settlements, 
effectively shutting some of these 
organizations down. Others have an-
nounced changes in their organization 
and business practices.40 
CONCLUSION
In the U.S., credit counseling 
organizations are playing an increas-
ingly important role in the functioning 
of the market for unsecured consumer 
credit. Credit counselors make it pos-
sible for some borrowers to repay their 
unsecured debts. This, in turn, offers 
borrowers the chance to re-establish 
access to credit more rapidly than if 
they file for bankruptcy.  
Credit counselors are also impor-
tant providers of consumer financial 
education and budget counseling, 
which, until recently, was indirectly 
subsidized through fair share payments 
made by creditors. If these programs 
are indeed effective, but creditors 
are now less willing to fund them, 
perhaps the public should. In other 
words, these activities may represent 
an important public good. A lender 
may well benefit when its custom-
ers become more sophisticated about 
credit, but the lender does not enjoy 
all the benefits. Some of the benefits 
are enjoyed by the customer and his or 
38 See Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Corp et 
al., 1st Circuit, No. 04-2039 (2005). A key test, 
according to the decision, is whether the orga-
nization is generating income for itself or others.
39 See the article by Caroline Mayer.
40 See the testimony of IRS Commissioner 
Everson, the March 2005 press releases from the 
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her other creditors. Thus, lenders may 
have an inadequate incentive to fund 
such efforts. While customers may 
benefit from receiving budget counsel-
ing and financial education, they are 
presumably unable to afford it at their 
time of greatest need. 
There is evidence that credit 
counseling organizations are effective 
in helping some consumers regain ac-
cess to credit and better manage their 
finances. But it is difficult to interpret 
these results. Are they due to selection 
or treatment effects? Relatively little 
formal research has been done, and 
there remains a lot more to do. 
In recent years, changes in tech-
nology and in the market for consumer 
credit have induced major changes in 
what had been a quiet life for nonprofit 
credit counseling organizations. There 
has been a dramatic increase in the 
number of counseling organizations 
and in the observable costs of debt 
management plans among unsecured 
creditors. Creditors are not so sure they 
are benefiting from the increased use 
of debt management plans.
Creditors and traditional coun-
seling organizations are beginning to 
respond to these new conditions, but it 
is too early to tell how effective these 
changes will be. There is also growing 
interest, both at the state and federal 
levels, in additional regulation of credit 
counselors. The idea is to make it easi-
er for consumers to make an informed 
choice among credit counselors.
But distressed borrowers must also 
decide between their different options. 
Is it better to file for bankruptcy than 
to participate in a debt management 
plan? If so, is it better to file under 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13? How well do 
borrowers understand these options? 
What organizations are in the best 
position, and have the right incentives, 
to educate consumers about these 
options? More generally, how can we 
quantify the effect of credit counsel-
ors’ activities on consumers’ access 
to unsecured credit and the price 
they pay for it? These are just a few of 
many important questions that require 
further study. B R
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